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Introduction 
 Scholars of economic development have been trying to explain East Asia’s 
economic miracle, more specifically China’s rapid economic development, for decades. 
Distinguished political scientist Stephan Haggard considers China “the biggest anomaly 
of all”: how did China manage such rapid economic development in the absence of any 
legal infrastructure for property rights and corporate governance? China is an outlier on 
all fronts. The neoclassical “Washington Consensus” on economic development dictates 
that development requires stable fiscal and monetary policy, low inflation, exploitation 
of comparative advantage, flexible labor markets, and laissez-faire governments.1 Strong 
property rights is usually seen in development literature as a necessary condition for 
development. It is a widely accepted notion that strong property rights provide 
incentives to invest, overcome problems that arise in private contracting, and constitute 
a check on any exploitative behavior of the state.2 Cross-national empirical work by 
                                                     
1 Stephan Haggard, “Institutions and Growth in East Asia,” Studies in Comparative International 
Development 38, no. 4 (December 1, 2004): 54. 
2 Ibid, 57. 
multiple scholars has found that strong property rights are positively related to growth.3 
Not surprisingly, it follows that political uncertainty is associated with lower growth in a 
cross-section of countries.4 To explore China’s economic growth despite not meeting 
any of the development prerequisites, in this paper we will take a closer look at where it 
all began: China’s transitional period right after the start of Reform and Opening Up, 
from 1979 through the 1980s. 
 To understand the significance of the lack of property rights legislation during a 
country’s development, we must first understand the concept of legal property rights. 
Yoram Barzel synthesizes the definition of multiple other scholars and defines economic 
property rights an individual has over a commodity or asset to be “the individual’s 
ability, in expected terms, to consume the good directly or to consume it indirectly 
through exchange.”5 Barzel argues that the economic rights people have over assets are 
not constant but instead a function of their own direct efforts at protection, of other 
people’s capture attempts, or of both non-governmental and governmental protection. 
Legal rights are the rights recognized and enforced, in part, by the government. Most 
notably, Barzel believes that legal rights enhance economic rights, but are neither 
necessary nor sufficient for the existence of property rights.6 The fact that Barzel 
                                                     
3 Ibid, 57. 
4 Ibid, 58. 
5 Yoram Barzel, Economic Analysis of Property Rights (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1997), 3. 
6 Ibid,, 4. 
believes property rights can exist independent of the law is significant, especially in the 
context of studying transition economies like China.  
 However, de facto ownership is still subordinate to de jure property rights. The 
concept of property rights is closely related to that of transaction costs, and a major 
consequence of the lack of established legal framework is high transaction costs. A 
property-rights based legal framework enforced by the state is generally considered a 
prerequisite for markets to function smoothly, as they bring the costs of transacting 
through markets under control.7 Coupled with the fact that neoclassical economic 
theory is based an assumption that individuals will always seek to maximize the value of 
their property, it follows that property rights law would be a driver of investment and 
economic growth.  
 Seeing as there are empirical anomalies to how China’s case has failed to 
conform to the conventional neoclassical models of development, we must take a closer 
look at explaining this anomaly. While China’s transition to a market economy began in 
1978, legal status was not conferred to private firms until “The Temporary Regulations of 
Private Enterprise” of July 1988, and regulations concerning the creation, transfer, and 
ownership of property were not put in place until China’s Property Rights Law of 2007.8 
                                                     
7 Mike W. Peng and Peggy Sue Heath, "The Growth of the Firm in Planned Economies in 
Transition: Institutions, Organizations, and Strategic Choice," The Academy of Management 
Review 21, no. 2 (1996): 502. 
8 Victor Nee and Sonja Opper. Capitalism from Below: Markets and Institutional Change in 
China (Cumberland: Harvard University Press, 2012), 6-7. 
In China, formal institutions have typically followed rather than preceded economic 
development, directly challenging the economic literature proposing that without 
appropriate institutions no market economy is possible.9 If property rights were 
seemingly secure, such security did not rest on formal legal and institutional constrains 
on state power. Informal institutions or some other mechanism must have been at 
work— China’s communist regime with weak legal and judicial institutions has 
nonetheless enjoyed unprecedented capital inflows, investment, and growth for two 
decades. Using a case study comparison of the establishment and growth of two of the 
earliest firms in post-reform China, I will argue that Chinese businesspeople used 
business connections as a substitute for property rights, with relationship-based lending 
and business-government relations playing large role in a firm’s establishment and 
growth.  
 First, I will provide an overview of existing literature on institutional growth in 
transitioning economies. Then, I will apply the theory to my case studies, the Aijian 
Corporation (上海工商界爱国建设公司, or “Shanghai Patriotic Construction 
Corporation”) and the China International Trust and Investment Corporation (中国国际
信托投资公司, or CITIC). Both corporations were officially incorporated within a month 
of each other in 1979 and contributed to China’s development as a whole, Aijian on the 
local level and CITIC on the national level. The Aijian Corporation was the first 
                                                     
9 Ibid, 17. 
corporation in post-reform China not under state ownership, and has never been 
formally studied outside of Chinese social science literature. CITIC was one of the first 
state-owned corporations to be newly established post-reform, and the first corporation 
to have overseas dealings. Both companies, though Aijian more than CITIC, relied on 
network-based models of investment and growth. This makes Aijian and CITIC ideal case 
studies in how firms navigated a volatile transitioning economy to promote 
development in post-reform China. 
 
Literature Overview 
 A growing collection of literature offers explanations of mechanisms as 
substitutes for formal property rights in China’s transitional stages.  A transition 
economy is characterized by weak market structures, unspecified property rights, weak 
formal enforcement of contracts, and institutional uncertainty. This lack of business laws 
makes market exchanges uncertain and very costly, so fledgling companies have to 
navigate growth in a hostile environment.  
  FIGURE ONE. From Stephan Haggard, “Institutions and Growth in East Asia.” 
 Existing models of institutional growth also emphasize the link between property 
rights and development. Stephen Haggard compiled various models of capital 
accumulation showing the conditions necessary for growth. Assuming that the existence 
of property rights reduces transaction costs and that the assurance of property rights is 
directly related to political regime stability, we can see that all the models in the figure 
above posit property rights or a substitute for property rights as a precursor to 
investment and growth. What model did China follow? China’s case does not neatly fit in 
any of the institutional models above, and is instead a combination of multiple models. 
China’s substitution for property rights during its transitional period seems to be a 
mixture of the authoritarian regime’s policy reforms that mobilized resources and 
improved allocative efficiency as well as business-government networks that solved 
commitment problems. 
 Stephan Haggard offers a top-down hypothesis for growth without property 
rights: “One possible explanation for East Asia’s success is that authoritarian regimes 
inherited, evolved, or consciously devised institutions that allowed them to signal their 
commitment to property rights and a stable policy environment conducive to long-run 
growth.”10 Other scholars, most notably Victor Nee and Sonja Opper, go beyond a state-
centered explanation to argue that throughout China’s decades of economic reform 
bottom-up institutional innovations played a crucial role in enabling and motivating 
capitalist economic development.11 Nee and Opper also emphasize the importance of 
the rise of a privately owned manufacturing economy, arguing that it played a key role 
in wealth creation and has dramatically changed China’s industrial landscape.12 We will 
mainly focus on two forms of guanxi: business network relationships and business-
government relations.  
                                                     
10 Stephan Haggard, “Institutions and Growth in East Asia,” 60. 
11 Victor Nee and Sonja Opper. Capitalism from Below, 9. 
12 Ibid, 3. 
 Informal norms develop to facilitate economic activity when economic actors 
cannot rely on the legal system to litigate the resolution of disputes over property rights 
and contracts. From a sociology perspective, informal norms arise from the problem-
solving activities of human beings in their attempts to improve their chances for success 
through cooperation.13 According to Nee and Opper, it was the development and use of 
innovative informal arrangements within networks of like-minded economic actors that 
provided the necessary funding and reliable business norms in early post-reform 
China.14 In such cases of a volatile and hostile transitioning economy, entrepreneurs in 
China’s transition economy rely on informal norms within their close-knit communities 
of economic actors to secure trust, acquire information, and make cooperation possible 
in a competitive economy. In spite of bureaucratic red tape and missing property rights 
protection, entrepreneurs have founded firms and built businesses on the basis of social 
norms without state-mandated contractual law guiding business behavior.15  
 The lack of property rights translates to uncertainty and risk in business dealings. 
In a piece from 1992, Victor Nee notes that socialist hybrids must rely more on personal 
ties than on legal contracts to provide assurances that the terms of a transaction will be 
met by both parties. The need for intense investment in personal connections (guanxi) 
stems from having to cope with widespread uncertainties in the institutional 
                                                     
13 Ibid, 21. 
14 Victor Nee and Sonja Opper, Capitalism from Below, 9. 
15 Ibid, 15. 
environment.16 Katherine Xin and Jone Pearce establish trust as a commodity and 
propose that executives seek out connections and cultivate close personal relationships 
to obtain resources or protection not otherwise available. In their study of various 
economies in transition, they conclude that such personal connections seem particularly 
important to executives in countries without a stable legal and regulatory environment 
that allows for impersonal business dealings.”17 Specifically, Xin and Pearce argue that 
managers in China’s transition economy cultivated personal connections to substitute 
for reliable government and an established rule of law, as those networks are useful in 
the regulation of transactions in the absence of state institutions for that purpose.18 
They suggest that Chinese private company executives operating without the structural 
protection of governmental support will not passively await their fate. Instead, they will 
cultivate close personal relations with people useful to business and use those guanxi as 
a substitute for the formal institutional protection.19 Mike Peng and Peggy Heath agree 
that during economic transitions, preexisting networks of affiliation are used to reduce 
uncertainties in economic exchanges during an extremely volatile period.20 
                                                     
16 Victor Nee, "Organizational Dynamics of Market Transition: Hybrid Forms, Property Rights, 
and Mixed Economy in China," Administrative Science Quarterly 37, no. 1 (1992): 3. 
17 Katherine R. Xin and Jone L. Pearce, "Guanxi: Connections as Substitutes for Formal 
Institutional Support," The Academy of Management Journal 39, no. 6 (1996): 1641. 
18 Xin and Pearce, “"Guanxi: Connections as Substitutes,” 1642. 
19 Ibid, 1643. 
20 Peng and Heath, “The Growth of the Firm in Planned Economies in Transition,” 506. 
 Stemming from a well-established business community and guanxi, relationship-
based lending is a mechanism many businesspeople turned to in a time when the 
banking system would not loan to private firms. According to Nee and Opper, during 
the founding stage, when investment risks are highest, entrepreneurs seeking capital 
usually turn almost exclusively to close relatives and long-term acquaintances. But 
without any legal contracts or property rights, how did relationship-based lending 
succeed? Nee and Opper believe that within these close-knit groups, lenders tend to 
feel a strong social and moral pressure to meet loan requests.21 Even so, the question of 
how they trusted their fellow businessmen to follow through remains. In this case, Nee 
and Opper argue that the stakes are high for those asking for an investment or loan in 
capital. Any defaults would be costly and would affect the continuation of business 
relations with other members of the business community.22 
 Next, we turn to a discussion of business-government relations as a substitute for 
certainty in a transition economy. Stephan Haggard believes that throughout East Asia’s 
development, political elites forged alliances with the private sector but simultaneously 
retained independent sources of political power over it.23 That political connections 
grease the wheels in all economic orders is a “nearly universal supposition.”24 But is it a 
substitute for institutions and infrastructure? Nee and Opper posit that political capital 
                                                     
21 Victor Nee and Sonja Opper, Capitalism from Below, 102. 
22 Ibid, 105. 
23 Stephan Haggard, “Institutions and Growth in East Asia,” 56. 
24 Victor Nee and Sonja Opper, Capitalism from Below, 233. 
shares with other forms of capital the capacity to make possible, under certain 
conditions, the realization of interests that otherwise would not be achieved.25 Without 
its political capital, our case study corporation Aijian would have likely not been 
approved. 
 For the economic actor, political capital accrues through personal connections 
with politicians and with the party in power.26 In China, the most “readily available 
source of political capital” is membership in the Communist Party.27 According to Nee 
and Opper, political connections serve as conduits of information between economic 
and political actors, with information flow favoring those with an inside track to the 
politician.28 These relationships are sustainable because both economic and political 
actors can secure gains in maintaining them. Good relations with the government can 
act as “insurance” to reduce the risk of unfavorable treatment by politicians and 
regulatory agents. Insider information flow can limit the uncertainties of a volatile 
political environment. For private firms that are often marginalized, ties with the local 
government and the Party can provide valuable networks and serve as social as well as 
political capital.29 Overall, good relations with local government fostered by 
participation in industry-wide associations sponsored by local government or by 
                                                     
25 Ibid, 234. 
26 Ibid, 234. 
27 Ibid, 237. 
28 Ibid, 235. 
29 Victor Nee, "Organizational Dynamics of Market Transition,” 10. 
membership in the Communist Party confer legitimacy to the firm.30 Especially for 
entrepreneurs experimenting with new forms of production or risky business ventures, 
the signal of political approval conferred by party membership can be critical for 
survival.31  
 Finally, we will examine theories on a network-based model of growth. Existing 
economic literature assumes that the firm in question operates in a market-based 
economy, is motivated to grow, and has a number of strategic choices that it can adopt 
to achieve growth. However, the socialist legacy as well as the recent transformations in 
these countries present an institutional environment that is immensely different from 
what a typical Western firm would encounter.32 In order to contrast the network-based 
model of growth with the Western model of firm growth, we must first understand the 
conventional Western model.  
 The Western model of firm growth is based on the assumption that growth 
driven by a strategic choice by top managers. Additionally, the existence of excess 
resources is a pre-condition for growth. The principal motivation for growth is the desire 
to fully employ underutilized resources. According to the Western model, the firm has 
three basic strategic choices for growth: 1) undertake generic expansion, 2) conduct 
mergers and acquisitions, and/or 3) develop inter-organizational relationships. The 
                                                     
30 Victor Nee and Sonja Opper. Capitalism from Below, 236. 
31 Ibid, 237. 
32 Peng and Heath, “The Growth of the Firm in Planned Economies in Transition,” 493. 
growth of the firm is limited by its ability to overcome transaction cost and bureaucratic 
cost incurred in the course of growth.33 However, in a volatile and uncertain 
environment, firms often do not have the luxury of excess resources, nor are there 
institutions in place to conduct mergers and acquisitions. Instead, networks stabilize 
economic activities by having members engage in reciprocal, preferential, and mutually 
supportive action. Information passed through networks from reliable sources becomes 
far more trustworthy. By pooling and coordinating resources, economies of scale and 
scope can be achieved.34  
 
Case Studies 
 Both the Aijian Corporation (上海工商界爱国建设公司, or “Shanghai Patriotic 
Construction Corporation”) and the China International Trust and Investment 
Corporation (中国国际信托投资公司, or CITIC) were products of China’s reform and 
opening up period. In early 1979, 邓小平 (Deng Xiaoping) invited the top five patriotic 
industrialists including 荣毅仁 (Rong Yiren) to his home and remarked: “We need to 
implement policy for the former industrialists and return their assets so they can 
establish factories or invest in the travel industry for foreign exchange. It is not good to 
let this money go unused, we need to give them options. In sum, we need to start using 
                                                     
33 Peng and Heath, “The Growth of the Firm in Planned Economies in Transition,” 498. 
34 Ibid, 514. 
the money, we need to start using the people.”35 What arose from this shift towards 
using capitalism for development was two corporations established with largely the 
same goals. Aijian was established in Shanghai with completely private capital, while 
CITIC was established in Beijing by Rong Yiren under the State Council with state capital. 
Both corporations were officially incorporated within a month of each other in 1979, 
dealt in similar industries, and were used to promote the Four Modernizations. The Four 
Modernizations were goals for national development enacted by Deng Xiaoping during 
reform in 1978 to strengthen the fields of agriculture, industry, national defense, and 
science and technology in China. This makes Aijian and CITIC ideal case studies in how 
business intertwined with politics to further development in post-reform China.  
The Shanghai Aijian Corporation  
 The Aijian Corporation was created as a special breed of private capitalism for 
patriotic purpose. Using a combination of private monetary capital and human capital, it 
was chartered in Shanghai on September 22nd, 1979 under the auspices of the municipal 
government. A hybrid of state and private capitalism, it was the first corporation in post-
reform China not under state ownership. The Aijian Corporation was not state-owned as 
all capital came from individual investors, but the goals of the company aligned with 
those of the state and the government was still closely involved in its establishment. 
                                                     
35 Feng Xiaowei, “邓小平与党外人士交往的故事” [The Story of Deng Xiaoping Interacting with 
those outside the Party], People’s Daily, August 26 2014, 
http://dangshi.people.com.cn/n/2014/0826/c85037-25541694.htm. 
After ten years of unrest from the Cultural Revolution, the government began to make 
reparations during the reform period to former industrialists by returning their assets, 
making interest payments on their assets and removing their “Rightist caps”.36 
According to the official history published by the Aijian Corporation, this return of assets 
led to “fervent passion among the former industrialists to repay the motherland.” Some 
of these industrialists proposed using their “excess” funds and overseas connections to 
start an investment corporation in order to “serve the motherland and the Four 
Modernizations.”37 With all these former industrialists allegedly seeking a place to re-
invest their returned assets, leading Shanghai businessman 刘靖基 (Liu Jingji) had an 
idea to create a “patriotic investment” fund. Since it would be too risky and nearly 
impossible to gain government approval for small private firms in the transitioning 
socialist economy, the former businessmen in Shanghai decided to pool their resources. 
 On May 19th, 1979, the director of the Shanghai Federation of Industry and 
Commerce (SFIC) Liu Jingji suggested the creation of the Shanghai Industry and 
Commerce Patriotic Development Foundation (上海工商界爱国建设基金会). Two days 
later, the SFIC and the Shanghai Committee of the China National Democratic 
Construction Association created the foundation’s Leading Small Group, chaired by Liu 
                                                     
36上海爱建股份有限公司[Shanghai Ai Jian Corporation, Ltd], 爱建志 1979-1999 [Ai Jian Zhi 
1979-1999] (Shanghai: 汉语大辞典出版社[Han yu da ci dian chu ban she], 2003), 6. 
37 Ai Jian Zhi 1979-1999, 6. 
Jingji.38 In mid-June, SFIC’s nine representatives to the National Chinese People’s 
Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) presented a proposal of the 爱国建设公司 
(Shanghai Aiguo Jianshe Corporation). The creation of the Aiguo Jianshe Corporation 
(“Aijian” for short) was well received by the central government, with the CPPCC and 
related departments pledging their support and attention.39 After securing the necessary 
political support for the creation of the company, it was time to raise the initial capital. 
At that point, they had already accumulated about 17 million RMB in investments, and 
set the fundraising goal for chartering the corporation at 50 million RMB.40 According to 
a 2013 interview with vice-chair Yang Yanxiu, they were the first company in the post-
reform era to solicit investments from private individual investors.41 Since the company 
was privately funded and did not receive bank loans or government investment, the 
corporation would technically be considered under private ownership as the very first 
privately-run (minying) corporation in post-reform China. In what Yang considers 
                                                     
38 上海市地方志办公室 [Shanghai Gazetteers Office], “Chuang ban Aijian gongsi” [“The 
Creation of Aijian Corporation”], shtong.gov.cn, 
http://www.shtong.gov.cn/node2/node2245/node4538/node57040/node57072/node57074/u
serobject1ai45520.html (Accessed April 19th, 2017).  
39 Ibid. 
40 Ai Jian Zhi 1979-1999, 7. 
41 Nian Shiping and Ni Leyuan, “参与创建改革开放后国内首家民营企业的杨延修” 
[“Interview with Participant in Establishing the First Post-Reform Private Corporation Yang 
Yanxiu,”], March 5th, 2013, 
http://www.shzgh.org/shmj2011/node637/node641/u1ai1796638.html. 
“unanticipated success,” over 1100 former business owners and their relatives chipped in 
to raise the company’s starting capital to 57 million RMB in only three months.42  
 On September 22nd, 1979, the SFIC and the Shanghai Committee of National 
Democratic Construction Association held a grand plenary at the Shanghai Exhibition 
Center announcing the establishment of the Shanghai Aijian Corporation. The Shanghai 
municipal government, the Shanghai Committee of the People’s Political Consultative 
Conference, related municipal departments, representatives from various Democratic 
parties as well as over 800 of the 1100 stakeholders were in attendance.43 The company 
was officially chartered and signed at this meeting, establishing Liu Jingji as chairman of 
the board of directors and Yang Yanxiu and Wu Zhichao as vice chairmen.44 It was also 
announced at this meeting that the board of directors selected Liu Jingji as Chief 
Executive Officer. The charter created a regulatory board to preside over the decisions of 
the board of directors and management, in order to ensure that “the governing bodies 
of this corporation followed the policies of the Party and the government.”45 
Representatives from the Shanghai municipal government were invited to sit on the 
regulatory board. While Aijian was to be privately run with voluntary private 
investments, establishing any corporation during this period in China’s history required 
a certain level of integration and accommodation by the government. 
                                                     
42 Ibid. 
43 Shanghai Gazeteers Office, “The Creation of Aijian Corporation”. 
44 Ibid. 
45Ai Jian Zhi 1979-1999, 35. 
Aijian’s original 1979 charter reveals much about its establishment and intent. The 
approved charter was deliberately worded to be politically correct. The first line explicitly 
states that the company was “formed under the leadership of the Shanghai municipal 
government”, and that it was a “socialist corporation.” This, of course, was said to 
appease government officials, as Aijian’s leadership team had fundraised all the capital 
themselves. The charter then claims that the company’s only purpose was “patriotic 
development,” that “private profit is not the goal.”46 The second line states that the 
company was fully funded on a “voluntary basis” from the “excess” assets of former 
industrialists, so that they could “contribute to the modernization of socialist industry.”47 
The charter establishes three main operations of the corporation: property construction, 
construction and service for the Four Modernizations, as well as funding compensation 
trade.48 Compensation trade is a form of countertrade in which an incoming investment 
is repaid from the revenues generated by that investment, for example repaid as a 
percentage of output from a new factory. Most striking is that the corporation would 
not take any profits, completely at odds with any modern conception of a corporation. 
The corporation’s revenues were “not for private gain” and besides paying taxes, were to 
all go directly to the accumulation fund of a public economic collective for “patriotic 
reinvestment.”49 
                                                     
46 Ibid. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Ai Jian Zhi 1979-1999, 35. 
The charter also provides more details on the terms of the individual investments 
that formed Aijian’s initial starting capital. Only former industrialists, their relatives, and 
overseas industrialists were allowed to invest, and the minimum investment was 10,000 
RMB. The investment would be for five years at a fixed interest rate, and at the end of 
the five years the interest would be paid and the investor given the option to withdraw 
part of or all of their investment.50 Under these terms, investing in this company was 
more similar to buying a fixed-yield bond with a five year maturity rate. As mentioned 
above, the 1979 version of Aijian would not take any profits, so there would not be any 
returns on an investment. Shareholders knew going in that they would not profit, which 
makes it interesting to examine the incentives behind so many people investing so 
much in a company that would not increase the value of their investment. Theories on 
how Aijian was successfully established with private capital will be discussed in the 
analysis section below.  
The China International Trust and Investment Corporation (CITIC) 
 CITIC, on the other hand, was slated to be state-owned from the start. The China 
International Trust and Investment Corporation was established on October 4, 1979 as 
an “experimental financial organization” to pursue “opening-up to the outside world” 
and “separating politics and business.”51 According to the CITIC’s Articles of 
                                                     
50 Ibid. 
51 “The ‘China International Trust and Investment Corporation’ and Its Chairman Jung I-jen,” 
Issues and Studies April 1985, 134. 
Incorporation, the corporation is “a state-owned socialist enterprise” operating under 
the direct leadership of the State Council, with an initial capital of 200 million RMB.52 The 
State Council was primarily involved in approving CITIC’s charter, setting out CITIC’s 
mission, appointing the company’s executives, and examining its mid-to long-term 
development plans. Former Vice Chairman of CITIC Qin Xiao claims that all other 
decision-making power was delegated to the company, even from the beginning.53 
While pitching his conception of CITIC, Deng Xiaoping told CEO and Chairman Rong 
Yiren: “You have the full authority to select the people you want. You take charge and 
assume all responsibilities. Don’t let bureaucracy grow in your own company.”54 
Therefore, while CITIC is and was state-owned, it has never been state-run.  
 Both corporations were established to move the Four Modernizations forward, 
with CITIC slated to bring in foreign technologies to modernize China. The corporation 
was originally conceived by Deng Xiaoping, as Deng believed that that China could use 
its money and nationalist capitalists to expedite China’s economic development. Deng 
had a meeting with Rong Yiren and four other top industrialists in January 1979 and 
specifically asked Rong to take advantage of his unique background and influence and 
do something significant to promote China’s opening and system reforms.55 Deng asked 
                                                     
52 Ibid. 
53 Qin Xiao, The Theory of the Firm and Chinese Enterprise Reform: The Case of China 
International Trust and Investment Corporation (RoutledgeCurzon: 2004), 94. 
54 Ibid, 95. 
55 Ibid, 93. 
Rong to use his “business mindset” to create a corporation and “sign contracts that will 
earn profit or foreign exchange.” He told Rong to “completely let go of worry about 
administrative matters,” that he was giving Rong “full control over company matters, as 
long as socialist matters are taken care of.”56 Deng even designated State Council Vice 
Premier Gu Mu (谷牧) to be in contact with Rong regarding the new corporation.57 Deng 
Xiaoping made it very clear in this meeting with China’s top industrialists that the state 
needed the technical and management skills of former industrialists. Deng asked for 
recommendations of businesspeople who could be of use, even those who had gone 
overseas so long as they were “patriotic and capable.”58   
 Rong immediately set to work on what in six months would become CITIC. By 
that time, central leadership had come to terms with the idea that they could harness 
the talent and resources of the capitalist class for national development. The People’s 
Daily reported that members of the China Democratic National Construction 
Association, National Federation of Industry and Commerce, over two hundred 
nationalist capitalists, and select members of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative 
Conference (CPPCC) gathered to celebrate the 1979 new year and dedicate themselves 
to contributing to “modernizing the motherland.”59 Rong Yiren was quoted on the eve 
                                                     
56 Feng Xiaowei, “The Story of Deng Xiaoping Interacting with those outside the Party.” 
57 Ibid. 
58 Ibid. 
59 “决心为实现祖国四化贡献力量 [Determined to contribute the Motherland’s Four 
Modernizations],” People’s Daily, January 16th 1979.  
of the corporation’s chartering that “we industrialists are one and the same with workers 
and farmers—we want to move the Four Modernizations forward.“60 
 The China Investment Trust and Investment Corporation was approved by the 
State Council on July 9th, 1979, and officially established on October 4th of that year with 
its first Board of Directors meeting in the Taiwan Hall of the Great Hall of the People. 
CITIC was chartered with an initial capital of 100 million RMB from the state. Between 
the initial capital, overseas investment funds, fixed assets, and tax rebates, the state 
injected a total of 1.825 billion RMB into CITIC.61 The Board of Directors was comprised 
of 44 people, with Rong Yiren appointed as CEO and Lei Renmin, Wu Zhichao, Chen 
Shuzi as vice-CEOs.62 The corporation’s primary function, outlined in its charter, is to 
introduce, absorb and apply foreign investment and advanced technology. The 
corporation is to import advanced equipment and to bring in advanced technology for 
the purposes of China’s national construction and promotion of socialist 
modernization.63 At the meeting, Rong Yiren stated that in the past three months, over 
300 overseas companies have contacted him regarding investment and partnership, and 
that a Hong Kong subsidiary was already in the works.64 The company’s original Board 
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of Directors included figures from related state bureaus, the China Democratic National 
Construction Association, and National Federation of Industry and Commerce, among 
others.65 Most notably, Liu Jingji, the founder of Aijian Corporation, was appointed to 
CITIC’s Board of Directors. 
 
Analysis 
 During economic transitions, scholars have concluded that pre-existing networks 
of affiliation are activated, and network ties become much more important as informal 
checks on business practices.66 These network-based personalized exchanges can be 
found in planned economies both before and during the transition. Reducing 
uncertainties in economic exchanges during an extremely volatile period, they are an 
important part of the informal constraints as well as the dominant logic that shapes the 
institutional frameworks. Given that both Aijian and CITIC were established during a 
volatile and uncertain time at the beginning of China’s transition to a market economy, 
how did they obtain solid footing despite the lack of property rights and other 
institutions? How did Aijian raise so much private capital? I argue that these anomalies 
can be explained by the founders of Aijian and CITIC maneuvering business network 
connections as well as business-government relations to gain monetary, social, and 
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political capital for the establishment of their corporations. Tying back to the literature 
and theories on this subject, we will first examine the roles of these two types of guanxi, 
then look at the role that the political uncertainty of the time played in business 
decisions.  
 In a time without formal institutions like property rights to protect assets and 
lower transaction costs, institutionalized networks play an important role in facilitating 
and formalizing business network connections. These institutionalized networks form 
the basis of informal norms and take the place of contractual law to guide business 
behavior. The World Bank first developed the argument that “deliberation councils” 
linking business and government played an important role in resolving credibility 
problems associated with authoritarian rule and building trust between the public and 
private sectors.67 Other scholars characterize East Asian states as having a level of 
“embedded autonomy,” or strong political and bureaucratic institutions that 
simultaneously maintained dense ties with the private sector. These councils and 
networks operate at different levels in the political system, can include representatives 
of formal business associations as well as individual firms, and may consider functional, 
industry-specific, or firm-specific issues.68 The existence and operation of such councils 
is thoroughly documented for Japan and Korea, but not for China.  
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 I have found two such institutionalized networks for businesspeople beginning in 
the Mao era: the China National Democratic Construction Association (CNDCA) and the 
All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce (ACFIC). Both had regional branches 
throughout China, and both became a forum for businessmen to network with politically 
prominent businessmen. In fact, the leadership boards of these organizations often had 
crossover with political leadership. The CNDCA, established in Chongqing by “patriotic 
industrialists, businessmen and intellectuals” in 1945, is one of China’s eight legally 
recognized non-communist political parties. To this day, it maintains ties with the 
Communist Party of China Central Committee and National People’s Congress, with a 
member of Standing Committee of the Politburo attending and speaking at its 11th 
National Congress.69 It is also closely involved with the All-China Federation of Industry 
and Commerce, a formal business association established in 1953, as its members 
consist of mostly businesspeople. According to its website, the CFIC is a mass 
organization “led by the Communist Party of China” and aims to promote the sound 
development of the non-public sector of the economy.70 During the political turmoil of 
the 1960s and 70s, these two institutions became the pillars of the business community, 
with much overlap in membership between the two organizations and with political 
figures in leadership roles.  
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 For example, Hu Ziang (胡子昂) was one of the original founders of the China 
National Democratic Construction Association and later became the fourth and fifth 
chairman of the All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce. Hu Ziang was also a 
vice committee chair for the second, third, fourth, and fifth National People’s Congress 
and a vice chairman of the fifth, sixth, and seventh National Chinese People’s Political 
Consultative Conference (CPPCC). In addition, Hu Ziang was known as the “King of Iron 
and Steel” and one of the top five patriotic industrialists during the pre-reform period, 
received alongside Rong Yiren and three others at Deng Xiaoping’s home when Deng 
Xiaoping announced new policy towards former industrialists.71 This is just one example 
of how prominent business leaders who were tapped to be political figures remained 
involved in these institutionalized business networks. 
 The founders of Aijian and CITIC, Rong Yiren and Liu Jingji, were also heavily 
involved in both organizations at the national and Shanghai level. Rong Yiren and Liu 
Jingji were vice chairs of the Shanghai National Democratic Construction Association 
(SNDCA) together from its first congress in 1956 until 1980. At the party’s fifth 
convention in 1980, Liu Jingji was appointed the chairman, a position he held until 
1988.72 Additionally, Liu Jingji held the position as chairman of the Shanghai Federation 
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of Industry and Commerce (SFIC) from 1961 until his death in 1997.73 On the national 
level, Liu Jingji and Rong Yiren served as vice chairs of the All-China Federation of 
Industry and Commerce between 1979 and 1983, when Hu Ziang happened to be the 
national chairman. Liu Jingji remained a vice chairman between 1983 and 1988 during 
ACFIC’s fifth congress, and Rong Yiren was appointed the sixth national chairman in 
1988.74 The leaders and boards of both corporations were pulled from these 
organizations. The founding of Aijian was essentially sponsored by the SFIC and SNDCA, 
and the members of its first board were concurrently leaders in both organizations, with 
the exception of Communist cadre Yang Yanxiu. Similarly, CITIC’s first board of directors 
contains many familiar names from both organizations. Being a prominent businessman 
in the form of being on the leadership boards of these two organizations led to being a 
valued member of the institutionalized business network, translating into gains in 
political and social capital.  
 The social capital gained from being a leading businessman in these 
institutionalized networks made it possible for Liu Jingji to solicit monetary capital from 
the community. The importance of reputation within the business community allowed 
Liu Jingji to convert his social and political capital into monetary capital in a time when 
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trust was a substitute for contract and property law. During times of transition, 
businessmen seeking initial capital like Liu Jingji turn to their networks of like-minded 
economic actors for funding because within institutionalized networks, informal norms 
make cooperation possible. The SFIC and SNDCA became a community of former 
capitalist business elites willing to take part in relationship-based lending. Reiterating 
Nee and Opper, during the founding stage when investment risks are highest, 
entrepreneurs turn almost exclusively to these networks. Within these communities, 
lenders tend to feel a strong social and moral pressure to meet requests.75 On the other 
end of the transaction, investors see a trusted businessman like Liu Jingji putting his 
reputation on the line, as any defaults on his end would be costly and affect future 
relations with members of the close-knit business community. 
 Identity as well as interests explains the willingness to cooperate in a competitive 
and uncertain environment. In the business community, identities are linked to the 
group’s success.76 The former Chinese business community, whether domestic or 
overseas, was an identity as well as a community. They constituted a group of people 
ostracized under the Communist regime, and thus had shared struggles and shared 
roots. This would explain the number of overseas Chinese businesspeople investing in 
Aijian in 1979. According to company records, 80 out of the 1100 initial investors were 
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from Hong Kong and abroad, and they alone backed 23.5% of the initial capital.77 The 
top three investors in the company resided in Hong Kong, Australia, and the United 
States, respectively. The top individual investor in the company was 王宽诚 (Wang 
Kuancheng) of Hong Kong’s Verder and Company, pledging over two million RMB.78 
One step down at one million RMB, Rong Hongren resided in Australia and 郭志娴 (Guo 
Zhixian) was the wife of Chinese-American businessman 沈坚白(Shen Jianbai).79 One of 
Rong Yiren’s brothers, 荣鸿仁 (Rong Hongren), was also listed as one of the top backers 
of the company with an initial investment of over one million RMB.80 Rong Hongren’s 
involvement with the Aijian Corporation extended beyond a one-time investment, as he 
was later appointed to the board of directors in 1988 and served as acting CEO for a 
period of time in the 1990s.81 A prominent Shanghai industrialist who moved to 
Australia after the Communist takeover, Rong Hongren played a large role in using his 
connections to promote the Aijian Corporation among overseas Chinese.82 Altogether, 
the theory of institutionalized networks and the role of reputation and identity in such a 
community help explain how Aijian raised so much capital in a volatile time. 
 Shifting to the other form of guanxi, business-government relations, we see more 
evidence of these networks acting as a facilitator for corporations during the transition. 
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Of course, it is intuitive that political connections are important in a regime like China’s 
especially during a transitional period. However, political capital was imperative for 
private firms like Aijian seeking legitimacy and survival. Because of the fear of “liability of 
newness,” newly founded private and collective firms have to resort to networking in 
order to achieve survival and growth. For young firms without the protection of a 
property-rights based legal framework such as Aijian, the “harassment from the state” 
remains a constant danger unless the firm played its political cards correctly. Such an 
uncertainty necessitates a defensive strategy to compensate for their lack of institutional 
protection in an uncertain environment. Institutional protection is a non-tradeable 
political resource, one that all private firms strive for. The resource-dependent model 
states that external linkages may increase the legitimacy of the new firm, thus improving 
its chances for survival.83 Aijian’s linkages with para-governmental institutions like SFIC 
and SNDCA certainly aided its chances at success as the very first privately owned 
corporation. 
 The leaders of Aijian played their political cards with tact from the beginning. 
They made sure to include a top Communist cadre as a vice chairman, and the other 
chairmen were leaders in either SFIC or SNDCA and thus politically well connected. Not 
only did they accredit the government and the Party for establishing the corporation, 
using patriotic language in its charter and being development-focused simultaneously 
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earned the support of the Shanghai municipal government and boosted investor 
confidence. Overall, good relations with local government fostered by participation in 
industry-wide associations sponsored by local government or by membership in the 
Communist Party confer legitimacy to the firm.84 In addition, Aijian’s association with the 
SNDCA allowed its leadership access to top figures in the Shanghai government like Hu 
Juewen (胡厥文).Hu Juewen was another one of the top five nationalist capitalists 
invited to Deng Xiaoping’s home, known for his dealings in machinery. He also 
successively served as Shanghai’s vice mayor, vice chairman of Shanghai city council, 
then a member of the Shanghai municipal economic council.85 Liu Jingji (and Rong 
Yiren) served alongside Hu Juewen as vice chairmen of SNDCA from 1956 to 1961, at 
which point Hu Juewen became the chairman of the organization.86 The annals of Aijian 
include photographs of Hu Juewen visiting with Liu Jingji and touring Aijian’s 
headquarters. Having someone like Hu Juewen advocate for a budding corporation like 
Aijian at the municipal level certainly improved its legitimacy, while also being a source 
of vital information.  
 In terms of CITIC, as a state-owned entity, its ties to the government are obvious. 
Rong Yiren and Deng Xiaoping had known each other since the 1950s, and Deng 
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Xiaoping appointed Rong Yiren to special positions on multiple occasions.87 Of course, 
most importantly, Deng Xiaoping personally entrusted Rong Yiren with state resources 
to create a corporation that would become known as CITIC. However, there are benefits 
of being closely tied to the government beyond access to capital and top Party 
leadership. Being an influential state-owned enterprise also meant access to the 
policymaking process. Starting from 1979 and throughout the 1980s, China 
promulgated more than 500 pieces of economic legislature, including Contract Law, 
Joint Venture Law, and Foreign Investment Law. Although still not adequate, the 
emerging legal infrastructure greatly stabilized the transaction environment, fostered 
the infusion of foreign capital and technology into China, and encouraged a great deal 
of entrepreneurial activities.88 Most significantly, the China Joint Venture Laws were 
enacted on July 1st, 1979, three months before the chartering of CITIC and days before 
CITIC’s formal approval by the State Council.89 This law presented foreign firms with 
opportunities to set up factories and manufacturing facilities within China. The Joint 
Venture Law was the precursor to establishing foreign joint ventures through CITIC, and 
necessary for the growth of CITIC. Of course, the passing of the Joint Venture Law 
coinciding with the establishment of CITIC does not prove causation, but it is important 
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to note that CITIC had much more favorable policy environment to navigate as a state-
owned corporation as opposed to Aijian, which had to rely on informal norms. 
 Last but not least, we will look beyond the two forms of guanxi to investigate the 
climate of political uncertainty at the time.  In a study of a transitioning economy, it is 
important to not overlook the important role that uncertainty and risk plays in business 
decisions. The anomaly of individual investors choosing to put their assets in Aijian in 
1979 without any return cannot be explained by any relational network theory. However, 
economic theory also fails to explain the incentive behind their investment. Neoclassical 
economic theory is based on the assumption of individual maximization, which implies 
whenever individuals of any society perceives that certain actions will enhance the value 
of their rights, they will undertake such actions.90 So why would over a thousand former 
industrialists decide to put their recently returned assets into a concept of a corporation 
when neither the corporation’s survival nor their investments themselves could be 
guaranteed? I would like to argue that these investments were not fully voluntary, and 
instead influenced by the level of political uncertainty at the time. 
 First, Deng Xiaoping had already taken the lead and said that “it is not good for 
money to go unused.” The government encouraged and perhaps even pressured former 
industrialists to not hold on to their returned money and to invest it— Yang mentioned 
in his interview that the Shanghai municipal government showed “enthusiastic support” 
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towards the former industrialists’ interest in re-investing their assets in national 
development.91 Meanwhile, with their assets returned, this former bourgeoisie class had 
so much more money than the average household and were perhaps afraid of being 
labeled as such again. While these former business owners were able to give over 
10,000 RMB (and often over 100,000 RMB) to this corporation, in 1979 the average 
yearly wage was a mere 668 RMB.92 It is important to keep in mind that these were 
capitalists who did not have their “Rightist caps” formally removed until Deng Xiaoping’s 
announcement at a CPPCC meeting on June 15th, 1979.93 There was widespread 
uncertainty over whether the government would regress on its promises and pardons. 
With an undeveloped capital market and few choices to invest elsewhere, investing in 
Aijian was a move that could maintain a “patriotic” political image for a group of people 
who were heavily ostracized during the Cultural Revolution. 
 Coupled with the lack of a property rights-based legal framework, the lack of 
political certainty played a role in these former capitalists prioritizing some form of 
assurance over their assets over economic profit. In China, the political process has 
experienced a number of ups and downs characterized by years of unrest and reaction, 
particularly during the Cultural Revolution. Peng and Heath agree that such fluctuation 
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in the political arena generated a great deal of uncertainty for the business 
community.94 I would like to argue that business people and asset holders during this 
time instead channeled this uncertainty into placing more trust in relational networks. 
Aijian investors put their money in a private corporation owned by someone well-
respected in the Chinese business community instead of in a state-owned bank, where 
their assets could potentially be once again confiscated by the state. In this case, barely 
a year into an uncertain political reform process and without any laws formally granting 
them rights over their assets, the former capitalists used informal norms within the 
business community as a substitute and entrusted their money with a colleague.  
 
Conclusion and further research 
With sufficient funding and government support, the Aijian Corporation 
experienced rapid growth during its first decade. When Aijian was chartered in 
September 1979, it had three departments, two offices, 26 employees, and a total capital 
base of 57 million RMB.95 By the 1990s, the company’s operations had expanded 
beyond housing development to focus on four main areas: financial fund investment, 
industrial investment, property development, and foreign trade. In July 1992, when it 
was re-chartered to become a limited-liability corporation, it had four departments, two 
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main offices, and 198 employees with over 150 million RMB in capital.96 The re-
chartered corporation, now formally known as AJ Corp Ltd., was publicly listed on the 
Shanghai Stock Exchange on April 26th, 1993.97 AJ Corp’s capital base grew 
exponentially after offering its shares to the public, doubling its total capital to 302 
million RMB by 1997. At that point, AJ Corp had 5 departments, 169 employees, and 
over 100 subsidiaries and joint operations.98 
CITIC also experienced rapid growth and expansion. CITIC began its equity 
investment activities in 1981. CITIC’s total assets grew from 255 million RMB in 1981 to a 
whopping 4.6 billion RMB by 1985, with this growth mainly attributable to equity 
investments and joint ventures. CITIC’s net profit was 2.5 million RMB in 1981, but had 
grown to 107.3 million RMB by 1985.99 By 1993, CITIC reported total assets of 82.5 
billion RMB, which include the accounts of CITIC’s overseas wholly owned subsidiaries 
and companies in which CITIC has substantial shareholdings.100 By 1994, financial 
services was confirmed as the company’s core business, covering commercial banking, 
trust, leasing, futures, and securities.101 Exactly how either corporation expanded without 
the presence of any financial markets or legal structures like merger and acquisition laws 
requires further study. While a network-based theory can explain the initial stages of 
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growth, how these Chinese corporations experienced exponential growth remains an 
anomaly. Even after the initial transition period of approximately 1979-1983, there was a 
lack of business structure, and China did not have a formal property rights law until 
2007. 
 This paper takes a closer look at China’s transitional period right after the start of 
Reform and Opening Up to explore China’s economic growth despite not meeting any 
of the development prerequisites. Using a case study comparison of the establishment 
and growth of two of the earliest firms in post-reform China, I show how Chinese 
businesspeople used business connections as a substitute for property rights, with 
relationship-based lending and business-government relations playing large role in a 
firm’s establishment and growth. Business in China cannot exist in a vacuum, so this 
paper explores the interconnections between disciplines and shows how sociology, 
political science, and economics need to intertwine to explain China’s anomalies.  
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